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Abstract
The possibility of exploiting multiple resources is usually regarded as positive from both the
economic and the environmental point of view. However, resource switching may also lead to
unsustainable growth and, ultimately, to an equilibrium condition which is worse than the one
that could have been achieved with a single resource. We applied a system dynamics model
where users exploit multiple resources and have different levels of preference among them. In
this setting, exploiting multiple resources leads to worse outcomes than the single-resource case
under a wide range of parameter configurations. Our arguments are illustrated using two empirical
situations, namely oil drilling in the North Sea and whale hunting in the Antarctic.
Keywords: resource management; paradox of enrichment; environmental sustainability
1 Introduction
Both commonsense and scientific inquiry suggests that exploiting two (or more) resources is both
economically more profitable and reduces depletion risks in comparison with the case where only one
resource is available. To a large extent, the possibility of exploiting new resources represents also
one of the strongholds for the idea of economic growth itself. For instance, the well known critique
of Beckerman (1992) of the idea that resource constraint represents a limit for economic growth was
based on the effects that economic feedback mechanisms have on the development of new resources,
i.e, on “ [. . . ] the various effects of a rise in the price of any resource that is becoming scarce: increased
profitability of exploration, of improved processing techniques, of increased research into substitutes;
increased replacement of the resource by existing substitutes in final use; [. . . ]” (Beckerman 1992,
483, emphasis added).
The fact that relying on multiple resource is beneficial for the stability of the system is a com-
mon statement also in community ecology. For instance, switching preys is known to help to sustain
ecosystems by allowing a recovering of depleted populations (e.g. Ajraldi & Venturino 2008; Khan
et al. 2004; Matsuda et al. 1986). This result is not limited to natural systems. For instance, Kat-
sukawa & Matsuda (2003) showed that switching among different targets improves both yields and
sustainability for fisheries under a wide range of conditions.
However, in the real world, larger resources often imply a faster growth of the exploiting popu-
lation or industry. This may produce a positive feedback that actually accelerates resource depletion
in comparison with a case where less abundant resources are available. This is not limited to human
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activities. The issue has indeed a long tradition in ecology, where it is often called the paradox of
enrichment (Rosenzweig 1971). According to the paradox argument, the increase of the carrying ca-
pacity of a resource population leads to a destabilization of a previously stable system, involving a
risk of extinction for both the resource and the exploiter populations. The idea of an enrichment para-
dox was subsequently contradicted by experimental results (Kirk 1998; McCauley & Murdoch 1990;
Persson et al. 2001), while Kuang (1999) proved mathematically that the paradox cannot occur under
the empirically relevant condition of ratio-dependent systems: i.e., systems where the consumption
rate depends on the ratio between the resource and the exploiter populations.1
Nevertheless, recent research provides new support for Rosenzweig’s idea. Chatterjee & Venturino
(2008) showed that the paradox can occur also in ratio-dependent systems, when further factors are
included in the model to make it more realistic, e.g., when the resource population can be affected by
a transmissible disease. Moreover, Tamburino & Venturino (2010) developed a mathematical model
to study the interactions of wild and domestic herbivores with a natural or man-maintained land-
scape. Their argument is that, when herbivores rely on two different resources—i.e., grass and young
trees—the growth of their population produces higher environmental damage than when only grass
is available or consumed. In the long term, this can also lead to a sudden decline of the herbivore
population itself. It is worth noting that Tamburino & Venturino (2010) also applied their model to
two different case studies, hence providing empirical support to the theoretical argument.
In this paper, we explore a different case of the enrichment paradox by applying this idea to
situations where multiple resources are simultaneously available. This can be regarded as an extension
of Rosenzweig’s model where the enrichment is given not by an increase of the resource carrying
capacity but by the availability of adequate substitutes. More specifically, we further develop the
Tamburino & Venturino (2010) model by generalizing their case and applying it to human management
of natural resources. The main difference with previous models is in the introduction of different
preference levels among resources. In other words, our model takes into account that real-world
resources are never exact substitutes for each other and that users usually have different levels of
preferences between them. Note also that the simultaneous presence of several substitutes permits
of modeling the enrichment also when resources are non-renewable, hence making our model more
general and more suited to applications to important real-world cases (see Section 3).
Overall, our findings suggest that relying on multiple resources can lead to an unsustainable growth
of the exploiting industry that produces worse outcomes than the single-resource exploitation case un-
der a wide range of conditions. The argument is supported by two empirical applications. First a
non-renewable resource exploitation case is studied: oil production in the Norwegian North Sea. Our
analysis showed that the exploitation of small fields, besides the giant reservoirs originally discovered,
actually accelerated the overall depletion rate of oil reserves. Our second case regards pelagic whaling
in the Antarctic, where more than fifty years of hunting relied on target shifting from the most to, pro-
gressively, the least productive (i.e., smaller) whale species. We showed that, if hunters had targeted
only the largest species, this not only would have avoided the commercial extinction of other whales,
but it would have reduced the impact on the main targets as well. Moreover, this would have avoided
the dramatic drop of the whaling industry that occurred during the 1960s and 1970s, permitting a more
sustainable management of the resource also from the economic point of view.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model and derives some general indica-
tions in an abstract context. Section 3 applies the model to the Norwegian oil case. Section 4 analyzes
1More formally, x being the resource population and y the exploiter one, a system is ratio-dependent if resource con-
sumption is given by y f (x/y), where f represents a generic function.
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whale hunting. Finally, Section 5 discusses the general implications of our results.
2 The general model
The system developed by Tamburino & Venturino (2010) included a herbivore population and its
resources and it can be regarded as a predator–prey system with two resource populations, namely
grass and trees. Even if herbivores consume mainly grass, they occasionally debark trees. This occurs
especially in the winter season, when grass availability is low (Sharrow et al. 1992). The authors
applied their model to herbivores grazing in both urban and natural parks. The same model, with
relatively small modifications, is also able to represent a generic system with a human population
exploiting a variable number of resources. Generalizing its form, the two resource model developed
by Tamburino and Venturino becomes:
U˙ =−µU + e1 UR1c1+U +α1R1 + e2
UR2
c2+U +α1R1+α2R2
R˙1 = f1(R1)− UR1c1+U +α1R1
R˙2 = f2(R2)− UR2c2+U +α1R1+α2R2
(1)
where U refers to the users’ population, while R1 and R2 refer to the exploited resources. While in the
original model µ represents the metabolic rate of herbivores and e1,e2 their assimilation coefficients,
we consider them respectively as the users’ capital depreciation and the proportion of the income
deriving from the exploitation of each resource that is reinvested in the same activity.
In Tamburino & Venturino (2010), the resource growth function, here generically indicated with
f j, is the logistic f j = r jR j(1−R j/K j), where r j represents the growth rate of R j and K j its carrying
capacity, for j = 1,2. In our generalization, fi can instead be any growth function of the resources un-
der examination, e.g. it can model inter-specific competition among the different resource populations
or can be set to zero in the case of non-renewable resources.
The function modeling users’ consumption of the first resource is given by the term
UR1
c1+U +α1R1
where α1 and c1 denote positive constants. This function follows the Michaelis-Menten model (Mur-
ray 1989), namely:
lim
U→∞
UR1
c1+U +α1R1
= R1 and lim
R1→∞
UR1
c1+U +α1R1
=
U
α1
meaning that when U grows, the consumption can be at most the whole amount of the first resource
in the system and, when the availability of first resource is unlimited, its consumption has an upper
bound proportional to the number of users: α−11 U . These are reasonable results, making this func-
tion biologically suitable. From the second property, we deduce that α−11 represents the maximum
consumption per user’s unit in the presence of an unlimited availability of the first resource. The pa-
rameter c1, called the Michaelis constant, or sometimes the half saturation constant, affects instead
only the speed at which consumption approaches its asymptotes.
The function modeling the consumption of the second resource is similar but, following the ideas
of feeding switching proposed in the classical Tanski (1978) paper and in a number of more recent ones
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(e.g. Ajraldi & Venturino 2008; Palomino Bean et al. 2006; Khan et al. 2002, 2004; Vilcarromero
et al. 2001), the first resource appears in the denominator as well. This function models a different
level of users’ preference for each of the resources. For instance, herbivores in Tamburino & Ven-
turino (2010) consumed mainly grass and only occasionally switched their attention to trees, with an
increasing rate when the first resource becomes scarce. Actually this is a rather general situation: when
several resources are available, they often present slightly different characters, making each of them
only an imperfect replacement of the others. Usually some are indeed preferred, due to easier access
and/or higher marginal value. For instance, traditional agricultural populations preferentially culti-
vated plains, moving to the hillsides only after a depletion of the fields or due to population pressures
(e.g. Diamond 2005; Ponting 1991). Similarly, surface water is usually exploited before groundwater
and renewable groundwater is preferred to fossil aquifers or de-salinization (e.g. Al-Rashed & Sherif
2000).
Model (1) is hence well suited to represent a generic system where a population of users ex-
ploits two or more resources with different preference levels. Extending (2) to the n resource case
{R1, . . . ,Rn}, with resources ordered by decreasing preference levels, we obtain
U˙ =−µU + e1 UR1c1+U +α1R1 + e2
UR2
c2+U +α1R1+α2R2
+
+ · · ·+ en URncn+U +Σni=1αiRi
. . .
R˙ j = f j(R j)− UR j
c j +U +Σ ji=1αiRi
. . .
(2)
Let us recall that α−1i represents the consumption per unit of user in the presence of an unlim-
ited availability of the i-th resource, namely the amount of resource a unit of user extracts from the
system. Actually, the user’s income is only the proportion of this amount given by ei/αi. From this
consideration, it is easy to see that the following relation must hold
ei
αi
>
e j
α j
∀i > j (3)
which simply means that the income which users are able to obtain from a given resource is greater
than the one obtainable from any of the following resources, making the first resource indeed preferred.
Moreover, from (2) we deduce that the ith resource is able to sustain the users’ population by itself
if and only if the assimilated part of the amount consumed, namely ei/αi, is able to compensate for
capital depreciation, i.e.,
ei
αi
> µ (4)
>From (4), we also deduce that there is a strict relation between the parameters ei, αi and µ , with an
increase of, for instance, µ producing similar outcomes as an increase of αi or a decrease of ei.
To study the model’s behavior, we ran numerical simulations of the system (1) using three re-
sources. As in Tamburino & Venturino (2010), we employed a logistic growth function for all the
resources. Being interested in comparing the case where users exploited only one resource with
multiple-resource exploitation, we ran simulations using the same parameter values, but varying the
number of exploited resources, namely three, two, or only one resource. These different exploitation
4
One resource
U,
 
R
1
Time
Two resources
U,
 
R
1,
 
R
2
Time
Three resources
U,
 
R
1,
 
R
2,
 
R
3
Time
U R1 R2 R3
Figure 1: Model dynamics for the three possible exploitation strategies under the first scenario, where all
resources are able to sustain users by themselves. The resource growth function follows a logistic scheme
f j = r jR j(1−R j/K j). Parameters for the plotted models: µ = 0.2, α1 = α2 = α3 = 1, K1 = K2 = K3 = 1000,
c1 = c2 = c3 = 1, r1 = r2 = r3 = 0.5, e1 = 0.21, e2 = 0.205, e3 = 0.201. Initial conditions: all resources are at
carrying capacity; one user enters the system.
strategies were examined under two different scenarios. In the first one, each resource was able to
sustain users by itself, which means that relation (4) holds for every i. In the second scenario, the
same relation holds only for i = 1. Note that if this assumption did not hold, users could not survive
without secondary resources, making a comparison between single and multiple resource exploitation
of little interest.
Figure 1 presents the results for the different strategies under the first scenario. With the chosen
parameters, users reach an equilibrium independently of their exploitation strategy but, in the case
of a multiple-resource exploitation, an equilibrium is attained only with the least preferred resource,
after destroying the favorite one(s). As a consequence, users’ equilibrium levels slightly decreased
when moving from one to three-resource exploitation. Moreover, in the multiple-resource exploitation
case, the system showed large oscillations while these did not occur in the one-resource case. In this
scenario, exploiting only one resource hence implied better results for both users and the environment:
for users because a higher equilibrium was established and large oscillations were avoided, for the
environment because no resource reached full depletion.
In the second scenario, when users exploit only one resource, they survive and find an equilibrium
with R1. No equilibrium is instead reached when users exploit two or three resources (Fig. 2). In these
cases, the system oscillates with sudden burst of the primary and secondary resources, followed by a
rapid increase of users and a subsequent drop of all populations. Between two bursts, only the least
preferred resource goes to carrying capacity, while users and the preferred resource(s) remain very
close to zero. In other words, between two bursts all the resources except the least preferred one are
depleted and the exploiting industry is completely dismantled. Moreover, unlike the model, in the real
world when a population reaches extremely low levels it becomes unable to recover, leading to a high
risk of actual destruction for both users and resources. To sum up, in both scenarios, exploitation of
more than one resource results in a worse situation from both the economic and the ecological points
of view.
We also explored the system response under a wide range of parameter variation, observing that
the outcomes presented above are quite general and do not depend on the choice of a particular set of
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Figure 2: Model dynamics for the three possible exploitation strategies under the second scenario, where only
the first resource can sustain users alone. The resource growth function follows a logistic scheme f j = r jR j(1−
R j/K j). Parameters for the plotted models: µ = 0.2, α1 =α2 =α3 = 1, K1 =K2 =K3 = 1000, c1 = c2 = c3 = 1,
r1 = r2 = r3 = 0.5, e1 = 0.21, e2 = 0.19, e3 = 0.15. Initial conditions: all resources are at carrying capacity;
one user enters the system.
parameter values. Since, as highlighted above, the system is markedly sensitive to the ratio between
the parameters αi, µ , ei, we produced Hopf bifurcation diagrams varying each of these while keeping
the other parameters unchanged. As an example, let us describe the diagram obtained by varying e1
and setting the other parameters as in the second scenario. For each value of e1, we ran the system for
2000 time steps recording only the last 500 in a dataset. We then plotted on the y-axis the minimum
and the maximum values of U (but the same could be done with R1, R2 and R3) corresponding to each
value of e1. When minima and maxima coincide, the system rests in a stable equilibrium, while a
difference between the minima and maxima implies an oscillation between these extremes.
The diagrams presented in Figure 3 show that, for values of e1 above a certain threshold (de-
pending on the other parameter values), the system starts to oscillate while below, it reaches a stable
equilibrium. This threshold varies depending on the number of resources exploited by users: the
higher the number of resources the more the threshold moved to the left. This means that there is a
whole range of values for e1 where the equilibrium is possible only if users follow a single resource
exploitation strategy, while exploiting multiple resources leads to an unstable system. Oscillations
become larger when the value of e1 increases, with minima of both users and resources (except the
last one) almost reaching zero, exactly as in the case described above (Fig. 2). Similar results were
obtained under a wide range of parameter configuration.
According to Figure 3, multiple resources allow users to survive even with small values of e1,
while using a single resource leads U to zero and multiple-resource exploitation would seem better.
However, in this case e1 is below 0.2 (or at least very close to it), which is the minimum value satisfying
condition (4) for the first resource, given the current parameter setting. This means that our assumption
of a first resource’s being able to sustain users alone no longer holds. Vice-versa, as long as the
assumption holds, multiple-resource exploitation became less advantageous, at least in the explored
parameter ranges.
To sum up, a multiple-resource exploitation strategy leads to the depletion of all resources except
the least preferred one, under a wide range of parameter configurations. Alternatively, this produces
large oscillations, with all populations (except the last resource) almost vanishing at their minima. Un-
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Figure 3: Hopf bifurcation diagrams of users’ population, varying e1. Other parameters were set as in the second
scenario. When exploiting only the favorite resource, an equilibrium is possible with values of e1 up to about
0.30, while in the case of two or three resources there is no value range leading to an equilibrium which respect
the assumption of a preferred resource able to sustain users alone.
der the same parameter configurations, exploiting only R1 does not produce such a complete depletion
and instead leads to a stable equilibrium. This implies the counter-intuitive idea that dependence on
just one resource is better than having multiple exploitation options.
3 Model application 1: Norwegian oil production
As a first application for our model, we choose the dynamics of oil production in the Norwegian
continental shelf. The case is especially interesting since Norwegian oil production reached a peak
in 2001 and subsequently declined (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 2009), representing hence a
clear example of Hubbert’s curve (Hubbert 1956).2 Most of the Norwegian oil production came from
a relatively small number of “giant” fields, while the larger number of “dwarfs” contributed only a
minor part of the total output. More specifically, Höök & Aleklett (2008) identified 17 giant fields
that, together, contributed more than 80% of the total production. Giant fields are easier to exploit and
started their activity mostly in the early 1970s, while only since the middle of the 1990s did dwarfs
begin to account for a significant share of production (Fig. 4).
In our model, we consider two resources, oil from giant fields and oil from dwarf fields, with the
former being clearly the preferred one. Both being non-renewable, we have fi = 0 ∀ i. There is also
no need to distinguish between e1 and e2, since both parameters refer to the same kind of output (oil).
The general model presented in (2) becomes
U˙ =−µU + e
(
UR1
c1+U +α1R1
+
UR2
c2+U +α1R1+α2R2
)
R˙1 =− UR1c1+U +α1R1
R˙2 =− UR2c2+U +α1R1+α2R2
(5)
In (5) the resources R1 and R2 represent oil reserves in, respectively, giant and dwarf fields, while
2For a recent discussion of Hubbert’s theory, see Brandt (2007).
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Figure 4: Oil production on the Norwegian continental shelf 1971–2009. Source: Norwegian Petroleum Direc-
torate’s Fact-Pages (www.npd.no).
users U represent extraction companies. Resources are expressed in terms of their value, with units
corresponding to the value of one million standard cubic meters (Sm3) of oil. Users are expressed
in the same units as capital embodied in extraction companies. It is worth noting that, since µU
represents costs while the second and third terms of the users’ equation represents revenues, U˙ can be
regarded as the net profit obtained by the oil industry in a given time unit.
Data regarding Norwegian oil reserves were extracted from the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate
database and led to estimate R1(0) = 4016.4 millions Sm3 and R2(0) = 1241.6 millions Sm3 respec-
tively. Since we model the exploitation of Norwegian oil from its beginnings, in the early 1970s, we
set U(0) = 1.
Recalling that the inverse of αi represents the consumption of resource i per unit of user (in con-
dition of unlimited resource availability), α−1i can be viewed as the energy returns from oil extraction
per unit of energy invested, a commonly used indicator called EROI (Energy Returns On Investments).
Recent research showed that EROI estimates for offshore oil drilling, including all direct and indirect
energy costs, range in the [5,10] interval (Gately 2007). We apply the upper limit of this estimate
to giant fields and the lower limit to dwarfs. This leads to a value of α1 = 0.10 and of α2 = 0.20
respectively. Estimations for µ and e are based on financial data released from the Statoil company
(Statoil 2009) and give µ = 0.36 and e = 0.74.
The Michaelis constants ci affect the speed at which production approaches its asymptotes. This
is hard to derive from existing empirical data, since this would basically imply a forecast of future
production trends, something that can be done only after the model calibration. Nevertheless, these
parameters can be estimated by fitting the model to the empirically observed dynamics. Note that we
employ data based on production figures, which are represented in our model by the second and third
terms of the users’ equation: (UR1)/(c1 +U +α1R1) and (UR2)/(c2 +U +α1R1 +α2R2) respec-
tively. We hence choose the ci parameter combination minimizing the root mean square error (RMSE)
between real and modeled production data. This leads to an estimation of c1 = 5290 and c2 = 9000.
Using these parameters, our model is able to reproduce reasonably well the empirical data, even if
it tends to under-estimate production from dwarf fields in the 2000–2009 period (Fig. 5a). The model
allows also of forecasting future oil production trends, an exercise that leads to the prediction of the
commercial exhaustion of Norwegian oil reserves before 2040 (Fig. 5b, black line). It is also possible
to build an alternative scenario where only the first resource, namely the giant oil field, is exploited.
This leads, understandably, to a lower production peak. However, it is especially interesting to note
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Figure 5: Model outputs. (a) Oil production 1971–2009: model output (plain lines) and real data (dashed
lines). (b) Long term forecast of oil production from giant fields: including production from dwarfs (black
line); excluding production from dwarfs (red line).
both that the peak itself would have occurred about 10 years later than the real case and that the
exhaustion of reserves would have been delayed by about 20 years (Fig. 5b, red line). Framed in terms
of sustainability, it is clear that using only the first resource would have led to a longer, and hence
more sustainable, time span of resource use than the actual case of two resource exploitation.
4 Model application 2: Antarctic whaling
While the first illustration of our model regarded a non-renewable resource—where it is not possible
to achieve sustainability in a strict sense, but only to slow down the exploitation pace sufficiently to
find adequate substitutes (Daly 1990)—in this section we apply it to a renewable resource, i.e. a case
where a sustainable equilibrium between human exploitation and resource regeneration rate is, at least
theoretically, possible.
Before the 20th century, whaling interested mainly the Eubalaena glacialis and the Balaena mys-
ticetus: relatively easy prey due to their slow swimming speed and to the fact that their dead bodies
tend to float. Due to excessive hunting, at the beginning of the 20th century these species where almost
commercially extinct in the North Atlantic. However, technology improvements allowed for the first
time the hunting of species belonging to the Balaenopteridae family (Cherfas 1988). After the First
World War, Antarctic blue whales (Balaenoptera musculus) became the main target of the new indus-
try, with catches that reached a peak in the early 1930s and experienced a rapid decline subsequently.
With blue whales becoming rare, hunters turned to new targets. From the 1930s to the 1960s—with the
exclusion of the World War II period when whaling almost stopped—fin (Balaenoptera physalus) and
humpback whales (Megaptera novaeangliae) replaced the blue whales as main hunt targets (Fig. 6a).
Finally, from the 1960s to the late 1970s, when an international treaty banned commercial hunting,
most of catches were made up of sei (Balaenoptera borealis) and later minke whales (Balaenoptera
acutorostrata) (Branch et al. 2004; International Whaling Commission 2002; Mori & Butterworth
2004).
A closer look at catch data shows a clear pattern: the most productive whales were exploited first,
with a subsequent shift towards smaller species, with sperm whales (Physeter macrocephalus) repre-
senting a partial exception due to the special use of their oil, e.g., in the US and USSR space rocket
programs. In terms of oil production, a single blue whale was indeed worth 2 fin, 2.5 humpbacks, 6
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Figure 6: Blue, fin and humpback whale catches in the Antarctica 1919–1975. The (a) panel presents the actual
data, the (b) one shows five year mobile means on the same data.
sei and approximatively 13 minke whales: a sequence that mimics almost exactly the shift of catch
targets. In other words, hunters first concentrated on the most valuable species, shifting progressively
to less productive ones when the former target disappeared (Clark & Lamberson 1982; Cherfas 1988;
Schneider & Pearce 2004).
These considerations suggest that our model is well suited for application to the Antarctic whaling
case. Here U represents the whaling industry (more precisely the whaling fleets operating in the
Antarctic) and R1, R2, and R3 the populations of, respectively, blue, fin, and humpback whales. We
preferred to exclude from the model sei and minke whales, which were hunted later and under different
market conditions (i.e., a stronger interest for whale meat and a reduced value of oil). As time unit, we
used the catching season and we evaluated all populations in terms of their economic value, choosing
as unit the commercial value of a blue whale.
We used the logistic growth function for whale populations, which implies a growth in condition
of intra-specific competition. The exclusion of the inter-specific competition followed from the con-
siderations outlined in Mori & Butterworth (2004): large baleen whales, such as humpback and fin,
are distributed farther North during the Antarctic summer and are not as heavily dependent on krill as
are blue whales. This means that blue, fin and humpback whales have ecological niches which are not
as closely overlapping as, for instances, blue and minke whales. Inter-specific competition can hence
be considered weak and need not to be modeled, at least in a first approximation.
We considered that e1 = e2 = e3 ≡ e could represent a reasonable assumption also in this case,
since whaling facilities could be used to catch any whale and investments did not depend from the
specific targets. Part of the reinvested sums were used to compensate the annual costs (µU in our
model), while the remaining resulted in an increasing of the capital U . Given these considerations,
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model (2) applied to Antarctic whaling becomes:
U˙ =−µU + e
(
UR1
c1+U +α1R1
+
UR2
c2+U +α1R1+α2R2
+
+
UR3
c3+U +α1R1+α2R2+α3R3
)
R˙1 =r1R1
(
1− R1
K1
)
− UR1
c1+U +α1R1
R˙2 =r2R2
(
1− R2
K2
)
− UR2
c2+U +α1R1+α2R2
R˙3 =r3R3
(
1− R3
K3
)
− UR3
c3+U +α1R1+α2R2+α3R3
(6)
The crucial issue in building a credible model is to assign realistic values to our parameters. Since
precise cost data are available only after WWII, we will use this period as a reference. Clark &
Lamberson (1982) argued that the building cost of a complete fleet, composed by a factory ship plus
usually 5–10 catchers, ranged from 10 to over 20 million US Dollars. The daily operating cost was
5000 USD per catcher, including fixed costs and depreciation. Clark & Lamberson (1982, Appendix)
reported a total of 2000 catcher-days per factory per year, but from other sources—including Cherfas
(1988), Ponting (1991) and Clark & Lamberson (1982, Main text) themselves—a total of about 700
catcher-days per factory per year looks more reasonable. This led us to estimate µ = 0.23.
To estimate the parameters α1, α2 and α3, let us recall that α−1i represents the maximum catch per
fleet, i.e., the catch in the presence of an unlimited availability of the i-th resource, see (4). We assumed
that this condition held in the second decade of the 20th century, at the very beginning of massive
Antarctic whale exploitation. Catch data from that period suggested an amount of 2000 whales per
factory per year. It seems reasonable to consider this figure as independent from the whale species,
which implies that the catchability of the different species is about the same (Clark & Lamberson
1982). This number has to be multiplied for the economic value of a single whale expressed in the
chosen unit. The value of a single blue whale ranged from 7,000 USD in the European market to
11,000 USD in the Japanese one (Clark & Lamberson 1982). Using the intermediate value of 9000
USD, we estimated α1 = 0.83 and, recalling that a blue whale was worth 2 fins and 2.5 humpbacks,
α2 = 1.67 and α3 = 2.08.
It is reasonable to assume that the carrying capacity of the blue, fin and humpback whales populations—
namely K1, K2 and K3—was equal to the existing populations of pre-whaling times. Branch et al.
(2004) presented a reliable pre-whaling population estimates of Antarctic blue whales of 239,000
individuals while, according to Braham (1984), about 400,000 fin and 100,000 humpback whales
lived in the same area. As before, these figures have to be multiplied by the economic value of each
whale species expressed in the chosen unit. We hence obtained K1 = 239,000, K2 = 200,000 and
K3 = 40,000.
Branch et al. (2004); Branch (2006) and Matsuoka et al. (2006) provided estimates for r1, r2 and
r3, i.e., the annual growth rate of blue, fin and humpback whales. According to these sources we set
as referring values: r1 = 7.3%, r2 = 10% and r3 = 9.6%.
>From (4) we see that e/αi > µ must hold for i = 1,2 because, in the real case, at least both blue
and fin whales were capable of sustaining the whaling industry by themselves before the excessive
reduction of their populations. This provides the lower bound e > 0.38, while the upper bound is
obviously 1. Unfortunately, it is not possible to derive a precise value of e from the existing literature,
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Figure 7: Simulated and real catch data (five year mobile means) for, respectively, blue, fin and humpback
whales. The vertical grey band corresponds to World War II period.
even if we know that dividends arising from the whale industry were usually high, especially in the
early period of Antarctic whaling, with dividends that where often higher than wages (Clark & Lam-
berson 1982). Therefore, it is likely that the value of e should be significantly lower than the previous
case. We hence selected e = 0.4.
To estimate the ci values, we followed a strategy similar to the one described for the Norwegian
oil case. Note that the Second World War resulted in an almost complete stop of hunting operations
(Fig. 6), although it did not allowed for a significant recovering of whales populations (Branch et al.
2004). We hence excluded the corresponding years both from the model runs and from the catch
dataset. The original data being highly variable from year to year, instead of fitting directly the model
on it, we preferred to use the corresponding five year mobile means (Fig. 6b) as target. This allowed
of avoiding an excessive influence of strong outliers (e.g., the over 30,000 blue whales caught in 1930)
on our estimates. This led to set the following values: c1 = 145,000, c2 = 95,000 and c3 = 1,650,000.
Figure 7 presents an overview of model output using the parameters described above. Overall,
our model is able to reproduce qualitatively the shift in the main hunting target that occurred in the
decades under consideration, even if it tends to under-estimate the actual figures and the catch peak
for blue whales is delayed. This is probably due to the fact that other species not included in the
model—notably sei and minke whales, along with sperm whales—represented important targets for
the real whaling industry and fostered its growth at a level above the one that results from our model
output (Cherfas 1988; Schneider & Pearce 2004).
Even knowing that our model tends to under-estimate the impact on whaling on whales popu-
lations, we still can try to understand what could have happened if no switching to less productive
resources had been available. Figure 8 plots the model output when including: (i) blue, fin and hump-
back whale (black line); (ii) blue and fin whales (red line); (iii) only blue whales. The exclusion of
the third resource proved not to be crucial in changing the model behavior, with only a modest shift
of peak catches to the right and both trends following closely the dynamic of the real population of
Antarctic blue whales (Branch et al. 2004). On the contrary, a stop of both fin and humpback hunt
would have had rather dramatic consequences. More specifically, the growth both of the catches and
of the whaling industry would have been much slower and a large share of the original Antarctic blue
whales population would have been maintained until the end of the period taken into consideration. As
before, the exploitation of a single species would hence have led to much more sustainable outcomes.
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Figure 8: Blue whale catches (a) and population (b) in different runs on the model including: all three resource
(black line), two resources (red line) and only one resource (green line). The vertical grey band corresponds to
the World War II period.
5 Conclusions
Our results show that relying on multiple resources does not necessarily produce better outcomes than
the exploitation of a single one. Often, relying on more options leads indeed to a faster depletion of
the preferred resource. Moreover, abundance causes higher production peaks, followed by dramatic
drops: a dynamic that ultimately reduces the possibilities of finding a sustainable equilibrium with the
resource.
More specifically, our model shows that the final equilibrium, in terms of dimension of users’ pop-
ulation, is similar or worse in the multiple resource case than in the single resource one. Moreover,
resources are exploited unsustainably with all but the least preferred resource becoming severely de-
pleted or destroyed. In other words, under a large range of conditions, relying on more resources does
not lead to a significantly higher welfare for users and simultaneously increases the environmental
impact of their actions.
The two empirical illustrations show that this conclusion holds for both renewable and non-
renewable resources. This is especially clear for the Norwegian oil case. The extra growth allowed by
the exploitation of dwarf fields in addition to the giant ones, accelerated the overall development rate
of the oil industry. This led, in turn, to a faster rate of consumption of oil reserves, with the effect that
the production peak occurred about ten years before the single resource case and the final commercial
exhaustion of the field has possibly been anticipated by twenty years. Note also that the lower produc-
tion peak in the case of single resource use would have required smaller changes for post-peak energy
production, with a cheaper and easier to manage transition phase.
The interpretation of the whaling case is less straightforward due to the larger number of elements
not included in the model. For simplicity, we only considered three whaling species—namely blue,
fin and humpback whales—while pelagic whaling actually targeted also sei, minke and sperm whales.
This led us to under-estimate the growth of the whaling industry. Nevertheless, our general conclusions
did not change: had hunters relied only on blue whales, this would have led to a more sustainable
equilibrium, with no commercial extinction of any species. Note that this condition would be largely
preferable to the actual one. Currently, official hunting (although some pirate hunting still exist) is
banned, even if at least two countries, namely Japan and Norway, use the excuse of doing “scientific
research” to maintain some level of commercial whaling. However, this is possible only thanks to
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the abstention of all other whaling countries. If commercial whaling were fully restored, besides
its ecological impacts, it would indeed quickly become unprofitable for everybody (see Schneider &
Pearce 2004).
To sum up, consistently with the idea of the “paradox of enrichment”, our work challenges the
commonsense notion that relying on a larger array of resources is necessarily better. This holds when
resources are perfects substitutes and accurate management is at work, allowing for a switching be-
tween equally valuable alternatives (e.g. Katsukawa & Matsuda 2003). However, in the real world
where perfect substitutes rarely exists, the availability of several resources often simply mean an un-
sustainable growth of the exploiting industry. In this case, the achievement of a higher overshoot
relative to the resource carrying capacity produces a subsequent deeper drop of the industry. Careful
management should hence take into account this risk by regulating the exploitation of each of the re-
sources under consideration, even when alternatives exists. If this does not occur, the risk is simply to
attain a worse equilibrium with the least preferred resource than the one that could have been obtained
with the most preferred one.
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